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Abstract Prior empirical studies provide evidence that the learning-curve per-
spective from manufacturing settings is not directly applicable to strategic manage-
ment settings. In the latter case learning relates to the quality rather than to the quantity
of experience. Regarding the antecedents of organizational learning especially, there
are still unanswered questions remaining; for example, the questions what kind of
experience has a positive effect on performance andwhat kind of experience ismore of
a hindrance than a help. This becomes obvious when looking at acquisitions as
examples of strategic management decisions. Results of prior empirical studies ana-
lyzing the relationship of acquisition experience and acquisition performance have
beenmixed. By introducing the concept of strategic consistency,we intend to facilitate
a better understanding of the kind of experience necessary for organizational learning.
Therefore, we measure the concordance and frequency of change in strategic actions.
Employing a sample of 379 acquisition series, we find evidence for a positive transfer
effect of strategic consistency within series and, therefore, a positive relationship









1 Institute of Management, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), P.O. Box 6980, 76128
Karlsruhe, Germany
2 Chair of Management and Control, Georg-August-University Goettingen, Platz der Go¨ttinger
Sieben 3, Oeconomicum, 37073 Goettingen, Germany
123
Business Research (2016) 9:101–131
DOI 10.1007/s40685-015-0024-1
Keywords Transfer effects  Acquisition series  Strategic consistency 
Organizational learning
1 Introduction
Acquisitions are important strategic management decisions leading to considerable
organizational changes (Barkema and Schijven 2008a; Cording et al. 2008; Ellis
et al. 2009). Acquisitions are complex transactions; they consume financial and
managerial resources going far beyond everyday business, in terms of both the
transaction itself and successive integration. Intuitively, one would expect that
acquirers with more transactions experience would better manage the challenges
coming along with acquisitions and, therefore, obtain a higher performance than
inexperienced acquirers. However, prior empirical studies analyzing the relationship
between acquisition experience and acquisition performance have been mixed,
ranging from positive (Barkema et al. 1996) via U-shaped (Haleblian and
Finkelstein 1999) and inverted U-shaped (Hayward 2002) to negative results
(Uhlenbruck et al. 2006) (see Barkema and Schijven 2008b; as well as Ellis et al.
2011 for an overview). As postulated by several researchers (e.g. Barkema and
Schijven 2008b; Ellis et al. 2011), these mixed results indicate that ‘‘researchers
need to dig deeper’’ (Barkema and Schijven 2008b: 595).
Prior empirical studies analyzing the performance effects of serial acquisitions
generally pursue two variant key topics: the effect of time or more specifically
acquisition patterns (Klarner and Raisch 2013; Laamanen and Keil 2008; Shi and
Prescott 2011, 2012; see Shi et al. 2012 for an overview) and the role of experience
on learning effects (Ellis et al. 2011; Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002; Haleblian and
Finkelstein 1999; Hayward 2002; Meschi and Me´tais 2013; Vermeulen and Barkema
2001; see Barkema and Schijven 2008b for an overview). We interconnect these two
perspectives by introducing the concept of strategic consistency, which we define in
this paper as the coherence of strategic directions of acquisitions within a series. The
concept of strategic consistency offers us the possibility to analyze the effect of prior
experience gained by earlier-executed transactions of a similar kind. Further, in order
to analyze strategic consistency within an acquisition program, the chronological
order—and therefore a temporal perspective—has to be taken into consideration. In
doing so, we aim to develop further important insights on both the theoretical and
practical levels of organizational learning in strategic management settings.
The concept of strategic consistency has always played an essential role in
strategic management research (Lamberg et al. 2009). Prior research has shown
evidence for a positive impact of strategic consistency on firm performance,
especially by avoiding conflicts between multiple strategic goals or multiple
measures to realize a certain strategic advantage (Lamberg et al. 2009; Milgrom and
Roberts 1990, 1992; Porter 1980, 1996; Robinson et al. 1988). Further, several
studies (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Prahalad and Bettis 1986; Rumelt 1980)
attribute strategic consistency to the mechanisms of cognitive patterns and shared
cognitive schemes. In this view, they adjudge strategic consistency to be a
coordination function in complex strategic management settings, as well as the
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opportunity to deal with imperfect information. Hence, we find indications for a
positive effect of strategic consistency on organizational learning effects. In contrast
to the high number of theoretical concepts related to strategic consistency, empirical
research in this context seems to be underrepresented, with most studies focusing on
explorative case studies (Lamberg et al. 2009; Richter and Schmidt 2005;
Siggelkow 2002), and to our knowledge strategic consistency has never been
empirically tested in the context of acquisition series.
Based on a large sample of 379 series consisting of 1990 European serial
transactions, we will empirically analyze the effect of strategic consistency in
acquisition series. We intend to supply an answer to the research question as to
whether experience in terms of strategic consistency has a positive influence on
organizational learning effects and, therefore, performance, respectively. According
to Barkema and Schijven (2008b: 596), we define organizational learning as ‘‘the
transfer of an organization’s experience from one event to a subsequent one’’.
By responding to recent calls in this field to further incorporate a serial
perspective into the acquisition stream of research (e.g. Laamanen and Keil 2008;
Shi et al. 2012), our intended research contribution of the present study is threefold:
First, we contribute to an improved understanding of organization experience and
organization learning by analyzing the transfer effect of strategic consistency.
Second, the study provides an expansion to empirical research on strategic
consistency by analyzing strategic management decisions that are externally clearly
detectable based on a large-scale sample. Third, our study proposes managerial
implications with respect to an improved development of acquisition capabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we
introduce the underlying theoretical concept before deriving hypotheses. The third
section covers our empirical study, especially descriptions of the sample analyzed,
statistical methods applied, and variables measured. Our empirical results are
presented in the fourth section. The final section provides a discussion of our
findings and outlines directions for future research.
2 Theory and hypothesis
Hereinafter, we introduce transfer theory as our theoretical framework. We outline
its applicability on organizational level, particularly in the context of M&A series.
Next, we define our conceptualization of strategic consistency and reason why we
expect positive effects from a transfer theoretical perspective.
2.1 Transfer effects
The basic idea that experience leads to higher performance originates from learning-
curve theory, which is applicable to manufacturing settings (e.g. Yelle 1979).
However, diverse empirical research studies have shown that the principle of
learning-curve theory cannot be transferred one-to-one to complex strategic
management settings (Ellis et al. 2011; Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002; Haleblian
and Finkelstein 1999; Hayward 2002; Zollo 2009; see Barkema and Schijven 2008b
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for an overview of research on organizational learning in acquisition settings). The
results of prior empirical studies show evidence that in strategic management
settings, as against manufacturing settings, learning relates to the quality rather than
to the quantity of experience (Hayward 2002). Yet, questions with respect to the
quality of experience, or, in other words, what kind of experience has a positive
effect on performance and what kind of experience is more of a hindrance than a
help, are still not completely answered (Barkema and Schijven 2008b). In order to
answer these questions, prior research studies have analyzed the transfer effects of
organizational learning (e.g. Ellis et al. 2011; Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002).
Transfer theory originates in psychology and educational theory and considers the
transfer of knowledge attained by learning in prior settings to subsequent, similar
situations. In order to distinguish this from knowledge transfer, Ellis et al. (2011:
1261) stress that ‘‘[t]ransfer theory concerns intraperson (or intragroup or intraor-
ganizational) transfer of practices and routines.’’ Thorndike and Woodworth (1901)
originated the theory of identical elements, implying that the transfer of learning
depends on the proportion to which the learning situation and the new situation have
similar characteristics. If the conditions of the learning situation and the subsequent
situation are similar, generalization—which means the application of experience—
leads to positive transfer effects and, thus, positive outcomes (Finkelstein and
Haleblian 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999; Hearst and Koresko 1968). If
conditions are dissimilar, generalization leads to negative transfer effects. This might
be the case especially when situations are at first glance recognized as similar, but are
structurally different (Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein
1999; Novick 1988). Discrimination of experience—which means the non-applica-
tion of experience—normally leads to neutral or no transfer effects. In the case of
dissimilar conditions, this is the correct behavior, but in the case of similar
conditions, this behavior is inappropriate; it may lead to the repetition of prior
mistakes (Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999) or at least be inefficient. Therefore, the
similarity and dissimilarity of prior and focal situations is crucial for transfer effects.
Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) explicitly examine whether transfer effects
occur at both, the individual and organizational level. They draw upon the
individual level theory, which describes the way in which the experience of one
situation affects another, in order to predict parallel organizational outcomes from
one situation to another. Organizational experience is integral to their study.
Organizations have memories, which differ from the memories of the individuals
belonging to the organizations (Walsh 1995). Although organizational memory and
individual memory are different, Walsh and Ungson (1991) reason that both types of
memory have the same function in terms of information processing. Organizational
knowledge is gained from experiences in three stages: information acquisition,
retention of experience, and retrieval of experience (Levitt and March 1988; Walsh
and Ungson 1991; Meschi and Me´tais 2013). In several domains of organizational
and strategic management research, studies build on transfer theory and foster its
applicability on organizational level. For example, in the strategic alliance context,
Zollo et al. (2002) examine the effect of accumulated expertise from previous
alliances in same technological areas on the performance of the focal alliance.
Nadolska and Barkema (2007) study three different sources of learning for
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internationalizing companies, namely experience with international acquisitions,
with domestic acquisitions, and with international joint ventures. Piaskowska et al.
(2014) focus on differences between diverse forms of joint ventures in order to
analyze transfer effects of prior joint venture experience on ex-ante and ex-post
performance of subsequent joint ventures. Hutzschenreuter et al. (2014) extend the
similarity perspective of acquisition characteristics by analyzing the impact of the
degree of mindfulness in the knowledge transfer process. In their literature review,
Barkema and Schijven (2008b) identify the research work of Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1999) respectively Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) as starting point
for further research studies analyzing experience transfer in acquisition settings (for
further literature reviews on research studies analyzing the role of acquisition
experience see e.g. Haleblian et al. 2009, Hutzschenreuter et al. 2012).
Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) examine transfer effects in acquisitions and
analyze the effect of similarity between acquirer and targets as well as the similarity
between targets of a serial acquirer on acquisition performance. They define
similarity as belonging to the same industrial environment based on a Standard
Industrial Code (SIC) comparison. The logic behind this choice is based on the
assumption that similar industrial environments allow for positive transfer of
management practices, routines, and knowledge. They find a positive and significant
coefficient for acquirer-to-target similarity, showing evidence for positive transfer
effects in the case of similar industry belongings of acquirer and target. Further, in
line with the expectation for negative transfer in the case of dissimilar targets in
serial acquisitions, they find a negative and significant coefficient in the subsample
of dissimilar acquisitions. Their findings correspond previous psychology-based
transfer research. They conclude that positive and negative transfer outcomes are
found at the organizational level. Interestingly, they do not find support for the
hypothesis of the second acquisition outperforming the first acquisition, when both
targets belong to the same industry. This result can be interpreted as a signal that
similarity of acquisitions refers to more than a shared industrial environment. Alike,
Hayward (2002) finds evidence for an inverted U-relationship between the
similarity of targets in respect of industry belonging and acquisition performance,
i.e. experience from targets that are not highly similar or dissimilar to the focal
acquisition increases acquisition performance.
Ellis et al. (2011) seize on the transfer theory and extend the analysis to size-
specific experience. Here, similarity is analyzed in terms of target size. They support
their argumentation among others with the thesis that large acquisitions—as they are
more complex—require other integration capabilities and processes as well as more
managerial capacities than small ones (Shrivastava 1986). Simply applying the
knowledge gained and evolved routines when doing small acquisitions to large
acquisitions would lead to inappropriate generalization and, therefore, negative
transfer effects. They find strong support for their hypothesis that prior small related
acquisitions will generate negative transfer effects in the context of a subsequent large
related deal. Further, they find only partial support for positive transfer effects from
prior experience in large related acquisitions to a subsequent large related acquisition.
Interestingly, both studies—from Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) as well as
from Ellis et al. (2011)—find strong support for negative transfer effects in the case
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of dissimilarities, but find only partial or no support for positive transfer effects in
the case of similarities in the principal characteristics analyzed. This can be
interpreted as a signal that in the case of existence of at least one main characteristic
of the two situations being different, experience is misapplied and generalization is
inappropriate. Whereas in the case of similarity between the main characteristics
analyzed, it cannot be ruled out that there are other important characteristics not
taken into consideration for being different (see Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002 for
an overview of possible dissimilarities between targets, as well as Hutzschenreuter
et al. 2012 for propositions regarding further transaction content and process
characteristics worthwhile to be analyzed in terms of similarity and their effect on
the outcome of serial acquisitions). By analyzing the similarity of one main
characteristic, it could still be the case that the past and current situations are
superficially similar, but structurally different. We assume that the similarity of two
complex strategic management decisions—as acquisitions—is not limited to the
main characteristics of the targets, like size and a shared industrial environment.
For example, when looking at the integration process, prior experience with
respect to industry belonging and target size are indubitably helpful. Nevertheless,
we assume that—especially during the integration process—experience with respect
to the kind of transaction is also of importance. According to Shrivastava (1986), the
need for integration is determined among others by the motives and objectives of
the acquisition. Integrating a horizontal acquisition needs knowledge, routines, and
processes different from integrating a vertical or lateral acquisition. A horizontal
acquisition requires an integration process at nearly every step of the value chain
with respect to procedural integration, i.e. integrating systems and procedures on
operating and administrative levels, physical integration like the consolidation of
production plants and technologies as well as intense managerial integration.
Vertical integration often requires only partial integration and only directly
adjoining steps of the value chain are affected. In the case of a lateral acquisition
pursued in order to gain entry to a new market, the need for integration might be less
extensive than in the case of a horizontal acquisition pursued in order to get access
to new resources, products, and managerial expertise. Integration is crucial for the
success of acquisitions. As several research studies have revealed, a lack of or faulty
integration leads to failure of acquisition (Barkema and Schijven 2008a; Cording
et al. 2008; Ellis et al. 2011; Ellis et al. 2009; Shrivastava 1986); for instance,
because the envisaged synergy effects could not be raised.
Thus, we find evidence that it is not sufficient to analyze whether targets belong
to the same industry. It should also be taken into consideration whether transactions
are similar in kind of acquisition direction. For example, several targets could be
active in the same industry, but on different levels of the value chain. When
analyzing the targets from an industry perspective (e.g. based on SIC comparison),
one could conclude a high similarity of these acquisitions. From an acquisition
direction perspective, they might differ: acquisitions on the same level of the value
chain as the acquirer would be rated as horizontal acquisitions, whereas acquisitions
on different levels of the value chain—e.g. an acquirer’s supplier—would be
vertical. When inferring experience from one acquisition and transferring it to the
next, relying on similarity solely based on industry perspective may lead to negative
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transfer effects, as the transactions are superficially similar (same industry), but
structurally different (different acquisition direction).
Ideally, the strategic direction of an acquisition represents the intended strategy.
However, a strategy is not manifested in one single action or decision; according to
Mintzberg (1978: 935) strategy is defined as ‘‘a pattern in a stream of decisions’’. So
far, studies analyzing the effects of similarities between targets have not taken into
account the chronology of the series. The measurement of target similarity is based
on the percentage of similar targets within a series. Take for example a series
consisting of three similar and two dissimilar targets. When calculating the target
similarity, there is no distinction, whether the similar targets were the first
acquisitions of a series or the last. From a transfer theoretical perspective, the
chronology of a series might play an important role, due to two aspects: forgetting
and retrieval of experience. On the one hand, decay and disuse of organizational
memory leads to organizational forgetting. That means that stored information is not
available to the organization any longer, for example due to lost or destroyed files or
individuals leaving the firm. Disuse is caused by the absence of information recall
over a longer time period (Meschi and Me´tais 2013). Decay and disuse are both
functions of time. The longer the time period between two similar events, the higher
the probability that the relevant experience made in a previous acquisition can not
be transferred to the focal acquisition. Discrimination of experience occurs, leading
to neutral or no transfer effects. On the other hand, retrieval of information depends
on the availability of organizational memory, which is associated with the recency
of its use (Levitt and March 1985). The other way round, organizations—like
individuals—tend to recall information from the recent past, rather than from older
situations. If the prior situation is dissimilar, negative transfer effects may occur. In
both cases, retrieval and forgetting of organizational memory, it is assumed to make
a difference, in which chronological order the three similar transactions from the
example above occur.
So, on one side, there are indications that the strategic acquisition direction might
be an important characteristic of acquisitions when analyzing transfer effects. On
the other side, the chronology of transactions might be of relevance as well. This is a
matter of strategic consistency.
2.2 Strategic consistency
The concept of strategic consistency is a fundamental subject already found in
classic works on strategy (Miles and Snow 1978; Porter 1980). Most studies adjudge
that strategic consistency has a positive effect on corporate success with respect to
performance. To name but a few, according to Porter (1996), strategic consistency
refers to a distinct, clear competitive strategy, competitive advantages and higher
profitability. Robinson et al. (1988) show a positive coherence between strategic
consistency of strategic actions for the purpose of the defined strategy, profession-
alism of the strategic planning process and corporate success.
Whatever definition of strategy one chooses to employ, it is undisputed that a
corporate strategy provides direction and serves as a rule for strategic decision
making. These main mechanisms of strategy are, for example, clearly signified by
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Chandler (1962: 13), who defined strategy as ‘‘the determination of the basic long-
term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and
the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals’’.
Following this understanding of strategy, consistency is a constituent element of
strategy. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992) strategic consistency avoids
conflicts between multiple strategic goals or multiple measures to realize a certain
strategic advantage, or that ‘‘doing more of any activity increases (or at least does
not decrease) the marginal profitability of each other activity in the group’’
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 108). Similar, Porter (1996: 71) argued that
‘‘consistency ensures that the competitive advantage of activities cumulate and do
not erode or cancel themselves out’’.
Strategic consistency is not consistently defined, a fact that is expressed by the
variety of associated concepts (Lamberg et al. 2009). Consistency is a relational
concept, as it associates two or more objects with each other. We follow the
congruency-consistency systematization of Mintzberg (1979), who distinguishes
between conditions and organizational parameters. Congruency means that the
conditions and organizational parameters fit, and consistency means that the
organizational parameters are compatible. Thus, strategic consistency can be
interpreted as the consistency of strategic measures. By applying this understanding
of strategic consistency to our research, we define strategic consistency as the
coherence of strategic actions within an M&A series or, more precisely, the
coherence of serial acquisitions and their strategic direction.
From a transfer theoretical perspective, positive effects of strategic consistency
are expected in two dimensions: First, positive transfer effects are expected when
executing transactions of similar kind. For example the experience gained when
integrating a target should be especially applicable, when transactions have the
same direction. The process of integrating an acquired target and reorganizing the
organization makes organizations unstable. The situation is characterized by a high
level of uncertainty and imperfect information (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Taking
into consideration the above-mentioned functionality of strategic consistency, we
propose that strategic consistency can be a means to overcome this unstable
situation and successfully manage the integration process.
Second, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) adjudge that strategic consistency provides
an opportunity to deal with imperfect information in a rapidly changing
environment. The coordination function of strategic consistency and its positive
impact on performance is emphasized by several researchers; for example, Rumelt
(1980: 360) stated that ‘‘[i]nconsistency in strategy is not simply a flaw in logic. A
key function of strategy is to provide coherence to organizational action. A clear and
explicit concept of strategy can foster a climate of tacit coordination that is more
efficient than most administrative mechanisms’’. In a similar way, research from
managerial economics highlights the coordination function of strategic consistency.
Shared schemas or cognitive maps add to improved information processing, in turn
leading to decreased costs of internal coordination. Strategic consistency, in this
sense, leads to a dominant general management logic or mental structuring
(Prahalad and Bettis 1986).
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These mental or cognitive patterns are also of high relevance in organizational
learning theory. They determine whether and how information is perceived, how
managers draw inferences from them and, thereby, store the gained knowledge in
routines that can influence their future actions (Cyert and March 1963; Levitt and
March 1988). Experiences must be codified before they can become knowledge
(Zollo and Singh 2004); they are evaluated and woven into the construction of the
organization’s reality. Inferences drawn from the experience are stored in corporate
documents, standard operating procedures, rules, standards of good professional
practice, and shared perceptions of ‘‘the way things are done around here’’ (Levitt
and March 1988). Consequentially, organizational memory is retained even when
important organizational members leave the organization (Weick and Gilfillan
1971; Levitt and March 1988). Interpretation of experiences—on the individual as
well as the organizational level—depends on the cognitive schemes and knowledge
structures of both individuals and organizations (Daft and Weick 1984; Walsh
1995). This means that information processing on both the individual and
organizational level is influenced by prior experiences. Knowledge structures
allocate attention (White and Carlston 1983), enable encoding (Cohen 1981),
retrieval from memory (Anderson and Pichert 1978; Cantor and Mischel 1977), and
help interpret experiences (Bower et al. 1979) (for details, please see Walsh 1995).
Pursuant to organizational learning theory, learning effects are influenced by
cognitive patterns, among other things, determining perceptions and conclusions, as
well as by the similarity of antecedent situations (Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999).
In line with the theoretical premises outlined above, our basic assumption is that
there are positive transfer effects of strategic consistency within acquisition series,
resulting in a positive relationship between strategic consistency and performance of
serial acquisitions. Particularly, if such positive transfer effects are assumed or can
be observed by the capital market, consistency—assumed to be effective—will
result in higher abnormal returns due to increased perceived efficiency within the
organization.
The direction of acquisitions is a good externally detectable indicator for intra-
series strategic consistency in strategic actions. Hence, the prediction is this: the
higher the level of concordance in strategic actions—understood in this study as
strategic directions of acquisitions within a series—the higher the level of strategic
consistency.
Therefore, in line with our aim to analyze the consistency of strategic actions, our
first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: there is a positive relationship between strategic consistency—in
the form of the level of concordance in strategic directions of acquisitions within a
series—and performance of serial acquisitions.
Further, we extend the concept of similarity in a second dimension, the temporal
perspective. As outlined above, the consideration of the chronology is valuable and
is expected to shed light on the performance implication of acquisition series. By
not taking into consideration the chronological order, we would risk not exploiting
the full potential of series analysis.
Therefore, we explicitly consider the chronological order of the executed
acquisitions belonging to a series and analyze the strategic direction of these
123
Business Research (2016) 9:101–131 109
acquisitions. Hence, the prediction is this: the lower the frequency of change in
strategic actions, the higher the level of strategic consistency. Our second
hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: there is a positive relationship between strategic consistency—in
the form of the frequency of change in strategic directions of acquisitions within a
series—and performance of serial acquisitions.
3 Empirical study
To explore the hypotheses, our research model contains strategic consistency as an
explanatory factor for serial acquisition performance. In order to measure serial
acquisition performance as a dependent variable, we use cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) and therefore are measuring the collective capital market’s
expectation regarding the likelihood of success of the announced transaction.
Given that acquisition performance is influenced by a set of other factors, we control
for contextual and transactional factors as well as for the bidder and the acquisition
series process. Hereinafter, we will introduce the sample, the research design and
the variables of our empirical study.
3.1 Sample
We examined a sample of 1990 serial acquisitions that were part of 379 series,
which were announced by 267 listed acquirers from the UK, Germany, and France
between January 1st, 1995 and December 31, 2008. Acquirers were listed as of
January 1st, 1995, in the FTSE350, HDAX100 or SBF120 indexes or were created
through a merger of equals prior to 2008. By choosing this time period, our sample
covers several M&A-cycles. The starting point of 1995 ensures that duties for ad
hoc reporting are in place for all three countries. Germany was the last to introduce
this duty, on January 1, 1995, due to the implementation of the second capital
market support law (Zweites Finanzmarkt-fo¨rderungsgesetz) and §15 WpHG (the
Securities Trading Act). To be included in the sample, acquirers must have been
clearly identifiable in Worldscope, Datastream, and Thomson Financial SDC and
not part of the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999). Furthermore, accounting
data in the fiscal year prior to the announcement date of an acquisition had to be
available in Worldscope, and capital market data up to 10 days before as well as
10 days after the announcement date had to be available in Datastream.
In the next step, we created an acquisition sample using the information from the
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) database of Thomson Financial SDC and by adding
missing information from mergermarket. In order to be included in the sample, the
acquisition must have been reported as completed by a maximum of 1000 days after
the announcement date (Moeller et al. 2004). The bidder must have controlled less
than 50 percent of the target shares prior to and more than 50 percent after the
acquisition (Fuller et al. 2002). For each acquisition, information on either deal
value or target sales must have been available one fiscal year prior to the
announcement date. The acquisition had to have a relative size of at least one
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percent (Masulis et al. 2007), measured as an index of target sales to bidder sales
and/or deal value to bidder market capitalization 20 days before the announcement
date of the acquisition. Based on this criteria set, the initial sample consisted of
2,220 acquisitions announced by 329 bidders.
In the second step, we derived the series sample based on the acquisition sample
using the following selection criteria: The series must have contained at least two
acquisitions in direct succession. The acquisitions had to have been announced
within a maximum time interval of 730 days (2 years). The approach follows
Hopkins (1987), Gregory (1997) and Ismail (2008) who define similar minimum
specifications for the existence of series. In order to avoid a bias resulting from a
cutout of the period under consideration out of the whole acquisition series of a
company, transactions were included in the sample only if the respective company
did not execute any transactions in the two previous years (1993 and 1994). By
doing so, we were able to ensure, that the series started within the time window
under consideration and not prior to the starting point of our sample. The selection
resulted in a final sample of 379 series consisting of 1,990 serial acquisitions by 267
firms.
3.2 Model design
Beyond descriptive, univariate analysis, we applied the method of multivariate
regression. With respect to the intended explanatory objective—the coherence
between strategic consistency and performance of acquisitions—we employed an
ordinary least squares (OLS) model.
Within our basis model, we distinguished two analysis levels. On level I, the
effect of transaction- and context-related variables was isolated in a separate
regression model in advance. This level served to isolate the typical transaction- and
context-related influencing factors of transaction performance, already verified in
previous research studies on single transactions (Fahlenbrach 2009). Resultant of
the level I regression are its residuals. Thus, level I regression can be viewed as a
medium for filtering out pure transaction-related factors validated for single
transactions.
The level II regression examined the relationship between strategic consistency
as an explanatory variable and the residuals of level I: Hence, indirectly, the
relationship between consistency-related variables and abnormal returns is
examined.
The level I regression features an OLS model based on the following equation:
Ai ¼ aþ bKi þ ei;I
for each (serial) acquisition i and the vector of control variables K.The OLS model
on level II is derived from level I and is based on the following equation:
ei;I ¼ aþ cEi þ dKi þ ei;II
For each (serial) acquisition i, the vector of explanatory variables E, and control
variables K, respectively.
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Figure 1 visualizes the two-level regression model structure and the respective
variable categories employed.
The core of the tiering is the differentiation of series-related and non-series-
related variables, hence the point in time of measuring the variables. Distinct
transaction-related and non-series-related factors are measured for each transaction.
Series-related variables reflecting strategic consistency and several control variables
are measured for each serial acquisition, but their characteristics are measured
cumulatively, depending on the respective acquisition rank in the series. Bidder-
relevant variables are recorded prior to the beginning of a series and not for each
acquisition.
The differentiation between levels I and II is pivotal for the setup of the following
model, its variables and statistical inference. In conclusion, we would like to
highlight three particularities. First, regarding applied independent variables, the
analysis is oriented toward the cumulative perception of the capital market. Second,
by definition, an acquisition series has to consist of at least two acquisitions;
therefore, only acquisitions with series ranks equal to or higher than two are
included in the analysis on level II. Third, a regression analysis on level I covers
typical transaction-related influencing factors on abnormal returns for all transac-
tions of our sample. Regressions on level II intend to explain the remaining
residuals from level I by series-related variables.
3.3 Dependent variables
Our focus is to examine the effect of strategic consistency on the expected
performance of serial acquisitions. The existing M&A literature has employed a
range of performance measures, mainly in two categories: accounting-based
performance measures and stock performance indicators. The main disadvantage of
measures based on financial statements is the time of measurement, that is, the time
lag between execution and reporting (Chakravarthy 1986). The financial impact of
an acquisition is elusive based on annual accounts; the single effects are not
assignable. On the contrary, the short-term time window of stock performance
indicators offers the advantage of time sensitivity toward the respective event by
closely linking the measurement of the effects to the event under investigation and
Acquisition PerformanceDependentVariables
Residuals Level I















Fig. 1 Model structure and variable categories
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excluding the effects of any other subsequent event possibly overlaying the direct
effect or preventing exploitation of the acquisition’s full potential. Therefore, we
use the CAR of a bidding company at the time of the announcement of the
acquisition as a dependent variable on level I. Although, using this dependent
variable is standard not only in M&A research (Betton et al. 2009; Boone and
Mulherin 2008; Lehn and Zhao 2006; Malmendier and Tate 2008), but also when it
comes to analyze learning effects of serial acquirers (e.g., Haleblian and Finkelstein
1999; Hayward 2002), we would like to highlight one important particularity. In the
logic of event studies, information transported via the announcement of an
acquisition will be directly—positively or negatively—priced in. Therefore, stock
performance indicators reflect the collective expectation of the capital market
regarding the likelihood of success or performance of the respective announced
transaction (Oler et al. 2008) and not the effective performance. Zollo and Meier
(2008) view it as a collective bet on the performance of the acquisition. To be
precise, in our research setting, this means that we measure perceived transfer-
effects, namely those that the market assumes will become effective. This aspect
reveals an important premise of event studies, namely the rationality and efficiency
of capital markets—a premise that is controversially discussed (for details, please
refer to Fama (1970); for its validity in the context of M&A, see Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1999), Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Oler et al. (2008)). As the
direction of acquisitions is a good externally detectable piece of information
available at the time of the announcement of the transaction, we follow the premise
of informationally efficient capital markets.We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985)





for the abnormal return AR of the acquirer i over n days t of the time window.
Following Fuller et al. (2002), we calculate CARs for the five-day period [-2;
?2] around the announcement date. Variations for robustness tests include the time
windows [-1, ?1] and [-5; ?5] and winsorized abnormal returns. Fuller et al.
(2002) reason that, for frequent acquirers, the probability is quite high that previous
takeover attempts will be included in the estimation period, thus making beta
estimations less meaningful. Therefore, we follow their approach and estimate the
abnormal returns using the following modified market model:
ARi;t ¼ Ri;t  Rm;t
where ri,t is the return for firm i on day t and Rm,t is the value-weighted market index
return on day t. The benchmarks for the calculation of the market returns are the
capital-weighted performance indices of the countries under consideration: for
Great Britain, the FTSE All Share; for Germany, the CDAX; and for France, the
SBF 250. The parameters have been estimated over a [-10 days; -200 days]
interval.
In order to examine acquisition performance on level II, we used residuals of the
level I regression.
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3.4 Measurement of strategic consistency
The explanatory variable is strategic consistency. In order to measure for strategic
consistency, we followed a two-step approach. First, we rated each acquisition
regarding its strategic direction, following Haunschild (1994). An acquisition is
considered to be horizontal when the target’s primary SIC matches the bidder’s SIC
on a four-digit level. Acquisitions are classified as related if this match occurs on a
two-digit level and there is no vertical relationship between bidder and target. An
acquisition is considered to be vertical if it is not horizontal and a bidder receives or
delivers more than five percent of its consumed or produced goods from or to a
target (Fan and Lang 2000; McGuckin et al. 1991). An acquisition is classified as
conglomerate if none of the criteria above hold.
In a second step, we used the results of this analysis in order to measure action-
related strategic consistency. In line with our hypotheses outlined above, strategic
consistency is measured as the cumulated rate of concordance of strategic directions
(CONCORDANCE), or alternatively, as the cumulated fliprate (FLIPRATE) of
strategic directions. We compared each transaction with its predecessor and
analyzed whether they are of the same acquisition direction. If yes, they are
concordant and no flip occurs. Hence, the CONCORDANCE increases. If the
transactions are not of the same acquisition direction, they are not concordant, a flip
occurs and the FLIPRATE increases. In order to eliminate the effect of a random
pattern of concordance or fliprates in a series, we modified the consistency-related
variables by using a randomized component. The actual cumulated concordance or
fliprate is calculated against an expected value of the cumulated concordance or


















For each focal serial acquisition i by bidder b, where a is the number of actual
cases of concordance in the series up to the focal acquisition, c is the number of
possible cases of concordance up to the focal acquisition at series rank r, h is the
actual number of flips, j the possible number of flips, and E is the expected value.
The calculation of the expected cumulated rate of concordance for each series
rank r is based on a multinomial distribution function. The calculation of the
expected cumulated fliprate for each series rank r is based on a binomial distribution
function. For further details please refer to the Appendix A. Further, we used a
short-term variable FLIP, measuring a change of strategic directions between a focal
serial acquisition and the previous serial acquisition.
3.5 Additional control variables
Previous M&A research indicates that a number of variables, both at the individual
and serial level, may influence performance of M&A series and should therefore be
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controlled for. Coherent with our model design, we distinguished two types of
control variables. The first type consists of control variables immediately related to
an isolated transaction and are therefore context- or transaction-specific. The second
type of control variable has serial character and is therefore related to a series or
related to bidders. As a transaction-specific control variable, RELATIVE SIZE
between bidder and target (Moeller et al. 2004; Seth 1990) is defined as the index of
bidder sales to target sales and deal value to market capitalization as a percentage.
Other binary control dummy variables include (1) PUBLIC, for listed target
companies (Chang 1998, Officer 2007); (2) CASH, for purchase price payments in
cash (Faccio and Masulis 2005; Travlos 1987); (3) HOSTILE, for transactions with
a hostile attitude (Franks and Mayer 1996; Loughran and Vijh 1997); (4)
TOEHOLD, for previous minority shareholdings (Betton et al. 2009; Franks and
Harris 1989); (5) CROSSBORDER, for foreign targets (Goergen and Renneboog
2004; Rossi and Volpin 2004); and (f) CONGLOMERATE, for conglomerate
acquisition direction (Healy et al. 1992; Morck et al. 1990). Regarding the latter
control variable, CONGLOMERATE, it is important to highlight that this
information is used in order to filter out the effect on each single transaction. On
level II, however, the classification as conglomerate acquisition—respectively as
vertical, horizontal or related—is used in order to derive the explanatory variables.
On level I, the information that an acquisition is conglomerate is used directly as a
control variable; on level II, this information is only used indirectly as an auxiliary
quantity in order to determine the explanatory variables. In line with existing M&A
research, we controlled for external factors influencing abnormal returns and used
context-specific dummy variables for year, industry, and country effects (Fowler
and Schmidt 1989; Moeller et al. 2004).
Series-related control variables include three variables: (1) VARIATION as
percent standard deviation relates to changes in relative acquisition size between
bidder and target over the course of a series; (2) TIME can be described as the
cumulated average time interval in days between acquisitions in a series (Hayward
2002; Kusewitt and Junior. 1985; Vermeulen and Barkema 2001); and (3) the
dummy variable LOSS takes a value of 1 for a focal serial acquisition in case there
has been a small loss in CAR in its previous serial acquisition. Small is defined as
negative cumulated abnormal returns between 0 and 3 percent (Hayward 2002).
Further, we added the variable Acquirer-Target-Similarity (ATS) as a cross-
calibration of existing concepts in organizational learning literature. Finkelstein and
Haleblian (2002), for example, argue that positive transfer will be more likely the
higher the extent to which the industrial environment of the acquirer is similar to
that of the target company. Based on Morck et al. (1990) and as Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1999), Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) and Hayward (2002) do, we
measure ATS using SIC codes. We adjusted the variable such that it is cumulated up
to the focal serial acquisition and weighted with the number of announced
acquisitions in the series up to the focal acquisition.
As characteristics of a bidder company are relevant to the performance of
acquisitions, we controlled for size effects among bidders, shareholder structure, the
existence of future, profitable investment opportunities, available cash, and leverage
of the bidder. Therefore, we used the following variables that are pervasive in well-
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reputed M&A literature: (1) SIZE, defined as the natural log of total bidder assets
(Moeller et al. 2004); FREEFLOAT, defined as the percentage of shares not closely
held (Dahlquist et al. 2003; Moeller and Schlingemann 2005); TOBINSQ,
approximated by the bidder’s market-to-book ratio (Bargeron et al. 2008; Moeller
et al. 2004); FREECASH, defined as a bidder’s free cash flow in percent of total
assets (Lehn and Poulsen 1989); and LEVERAGE, defined as a bidder’s long-term
debt as a percentage of total assets (Faccio et al. 2006; Rhodes-Kropf et al. 2005).
Moreover, we reflect the current level of diversification among bidders by using the
variable ‘‘ENTROPY’’. This variable is measured based on the definition by
Jacquemin and Berry (1979) capturing a related and unrelated part of diversifica-
tion. In order to eliminate serial effects on bidder characteristics, the time of
measurement is prior to the beginning of an acquisition series and not prior to each
acquisition. Table 1 provides the sample descriptive statistics and correlations for
all variables discussed above.
4 Results
Corresponding to our research design, we first present the results of the multivariate
analysis on level I dedicated to the transaction and context-related effects before
then analyzing the effects of strategic consistency.
4.1 Multivariate analysis on level I: transaction- and context-related effects
The purpose of the OLS regression on level I is to isolate transaction- and context-
related effects. Table 2 shows results from the multivariate regression on level I.
Model (I.1) includes key transaction-related control variables, and model (I.2) adds
dummy variables on the context-related factors year, industry, and country.
Abnormal returns and the effect of control variables of the level I model confirm
the results of existing M&A research (e.g. Moeller et al. 2004; Fuller et al. 2002;
Faccio et al. 2006). With its residuals, model (I.2) serves as a basis for level II
regressions, including the analysis on strategic consistency as an explanatory
variable.
4.2 Multivariate analysis on level II: effects of strategic consistency
The purpose of OLS regression on level II is to explain the remaining residuals from
level I by series related variables. In order to analyze the relationship between
strategic consistency and abnormal returns, we constructed five models on level II.
Table 3 presents our model versions (II.0) through (II.4) based on the residuals of
model (I.2) from level I. Model (II.0) is the basis model without any independent
variable. Model (II.1) is the standard model of level II analysis, featuring
CONCORDANCE as the key explanatory variable. Model (II.2) includes
FLIPRATE instead of CONCORDANCE. In model (II.3), we replaced FLIPRATE
with FLIP. In a slightly changed model setup (II.4), we include dummy variables for
series ranks assigned to a particular focal serial acquisition.
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Overall, we find evidence for a positive impact of strategic consistency in
acquisition series on acquisition performance. We measured strategic consistency in
a variety of ways; all of them confirm our hypothesis of a positive relationship
between strategic consistency and the performance of serial acquisitions.
CONCORDANCE, as an operationalization of strategic consistency in an
acquisition series, shows a significantly positive coefficient in model (II.1),
supporting hypothesis 1 and indicating a positive relationship between strategic
consistency in terms of strategic directions of acquisitions within a series and level I
residuals, reflecting acquisition performance after controlling for transaction-related
factors. The variable FLIPRATE has an almost inverted behavior compared to
CONCORDANCE, showing a significant negative relationship with acquisition
performance [see model (II.2)], supporting hypothesis 2. With respect to the
variable FLIP, as illustrated in model (II.3), a strongly significant negative
coefficient can be observed. Both variables FLIP and FLIPRATE reflect the
frequency of change in strategic actions; the higher the frequency of change, the
lower the level of strategic consistency.
Table 2 Level I—Effect of transaction- and context-related variables
Models
(I.1) (I.2)
Dep.Var. CAR [-2;?2] Dep.Var. CAR [-2;?2]
Coeff. sign.
level [t stat.]
p value Coeff. sign.
level [t stat.]
p value
Relative size 0.019** [2.12] 0.034 0.019** [2.07] 0.039
Public -0.010** [-2.41] 0.016 -0.010 **
[-2.42]
0.016
Cash 0.011* [1.85] 0.065 0.014** [2.36] 0.018
Hostile -0.004 [-0.33] 0.742 -0.003 [-0.21] 0.834
Toehold 0.005 [0.98] 0.326 0.006 [1.13] 0.261
Crossborder 0.003 [1.07] 0.284 0.002 [0.56] 0.575
Conglomerate -0.001 [-0.39] 0.697 -0.004 [-1.11] 0.267
Constant -0.004 [-0.66] 0.507 0.036 [0.93] 0.350
Context-related dummy variables (year,
industry, country)
No Yes
Regression model OLS OLS
Heteroscedasticity (Breusch/Pagan) Yes*** 0.000 Yes*** 0.000
Autocorrelation (Wooldridge) No 0.705 No 0.705
Observations 1769 1769
R2 0.012 0.046
Adj. R2 0.008 0.09
F statistic 2.30 1.633
p value: ***\0.01; **\0.05; *\0.1
We used White clustered standard errors to mitigate the effect of heteroscedasticity
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As can be seen in model (II.4), in which we introduced dummy variables for
series ranks, no major changes can be observed with regard to the explanatory
variable CONCORDANCE. However, the goodness of fit and overall significance
of the regression is slightly reduced. Thus, rank effects do not explain a significant
share of total variance in the multivariate model setup.
4.3 Robustness checks and general validity of linear regression model
In order to overcome general constraints of the quality of linear regression models, we
conducted tests for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation,multi-collinearity, endogeneity
and normal distribution. We used the Breusch-Pagan test to test for heteroscedasticity.
The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected for all OLS regression setups in this
paper. However, we corrected for this issue by applying heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors and covariance based on White (1980) directly in the regression. Serial
correlation was tested using the Wooldridge test. Results of both tests, the Woldridge
and theBreusch-Pagan, are reported inTables 2 and 3.With respect tomulticollinearity,
we report the maximum variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each variable in Table 4.
According toCraney and Surles (2002), values forVIFs equal to or below 5 indicate that
the problem of multicollinearity can be rejected. Endogeneity in respect to the
explanatory variable may not be expected, as it might not be argued conclusively why
abnormal returns should influence the strategic consistency of a series. Omitted
variables can never be ruled out. However, our models contain a large variety of all
canonic variables of the M&A literature. By approximation, we analyzed the
fundamental assumption of no covariance between independent variables and error
termswith an analysis of covariance (Pearson). For none of the control and independent
variables, the null hypothesis of absence of covariance with the error terms can by
rejectedwith sufficient enough significance level (seeAppendix 2). Normal distribution
was tested using a graphical analysis of the residues of Level I and Level II (see
Appendix 3), revealing a normally distributed behavior of both groups of residues. To
conclude, the problems of linear regression models can be rejected.
The quality and robustness of our conclusions was validated by running regressions
with modified specifications in three different ways. First, we removed the control
variable ATS from themodel, as it was used as a cross-calibration of existing concepts
in organizational learning literature. Second, we rerun all the regressions based on a
different definition criteria for acquisitions belonging to a series. The acquisitions did
not have to be announced within a maximum time interval of two years, but within a
maximum time interval of (a) three, (b) four and (c) five years. Further, we treated each
acquirer as one series. These new series definitions were used to rerun regressions on
the original sample, as well as on an adapted sample. In the later case the starting point
of each series was identified by taking into consideration a timeout of three, four and
five years respectively before the first acquisition of a series. Third, we modified our
dependent variable on level I: the CARs were calculated on the alternative time
windows [-1, ? 1] and [-5; ? 5]. Further wemade results robust against outliers by
winsorizing the CARs (all three time windows) by a maximal deviation of three times
standard deviation from mean. All modifications resulted in qualitatively the same
results. Results for all robustness tests are available upon request.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
5.1 Implications and contribution
The aim of this study was to shed additional light on our understanding of the
relationship between acquisition experience and acquisition performance. By
applying transfer theory, we analyzed whether strategic consistency—signifying the











Max. VIF 1.23 1.33
Level II Models
II.0 II.1 II.2 II.3 II.4
Variable VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
Series-related control variables
Time 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.07
Variation 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.11
Loss 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.13 2.53
ATS 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.09
Bidder-related control variables
Size 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.19
Tobinsq 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
Freecash 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.06
Leverage 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10
Freefloat 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.12





Max. VIF 1.17 1.19 1.19 1.19 2.53
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similarity of strategic direction of acquisitions—has positive performance effects on
serial acquisitions. Based on a sample of 379 series consisting of 1990 serial
acquisitions, we have found evidence for a significantly positive relationship
between strategic consistency and acquisition performance in terms of CAR. The
relationship holds true for the rate of concordance of strategic directions in a series
and—inversely negative—for the rate of changes of directions.
From a conceptual point of view, we believe the study makes an important
contribution in three dimensions. First, our study contributes to the organizational
learning literature to the effect that we combine two different research streams that
have evolved over time separately: research on negative experience transfer and
research on deliberate learning mechanisms (see Barkema and Schijven 2008b for
an overview). By analyzing the transfer effects of strategic consistency and,
therefore, shifting the perspective from the similarity of targets to the kind of
transaction, we were able to shed additional light on the kind of experience that is
helpful for organizational learning mechanisms in strategic management settings.
Acquisitions offer the possibility to analyze the transfer effects of strategic
consistency, as they are discrete and observable strategic management decisions
(see also Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999 as well as Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002).
In a similar way, the analysis of the role strategic consistency is playing in
organizational learning offers us a deeper insight into how acquirers develop and
adapt competencies to execute individual acquisitions as well as to manage
acquisition series (see Laamanen and Keil 2008 for a differentiation of different
layers of acquisition capability development). Strategic consistency provides
managers with the ability to draw inferences from prior acquisitions and transfer
the gained knowledge, developed processes and routines to the focal acquisition
where applicable. Further, strategic consistency provides managers with direction
within the strategic decision-making process, thus helping to manage the overall
acquisition program.
Second, the results empirically support the theoretical approach of several
theoretical research studies analyzing strategic consistency. The study provides an
expansion of empirical research on strategic consistency by analyzing externally
and clearly detectable strategic management decisions based on a large-scale
sample. One reason for the quantitative under-representation of research studies
analyzing strategic consistency of strategic management decisions might be that
they are externally hard to comprehend and, therefore, hard to measure. Here, again,
analyzing M&A series provides the possibility to overcome this limitation. In our
study, we analyze the consistency of empirically identifiable decisions with
historical decisions of similar type and challenge their performance relevance.
Third, our study provides two managerial implications. On the one hand, we hope
our study will contribute to the improvement in discrimination and generalization by
management. By taking into consideration the aspect of strategic consistency,
managers will be provided with a different cognitive mindset and different
discrimination criteria for their decisions as to whether to draw upon previous
gained acquisition experience. Our results suggest that drawing inferences from
experience based on strategic consistency will lead to a more appropriate integration
of the acquired target, to a higher exhausting of synergy effects and, lastly, higher
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performance or a lower rate of unsuccessful acquisitions. On the other hand, the
study emphasizes the perception of strategic consistency of external market
participants when evaluating the advantageousness of transactions. They do look for
externally observable signals of strategic consistency, such as concordance and a
low fliprate. Therefore, they evaluate the consistency of each single transaction with
the overall corporate strategy as well as with other previously executed acquisitions.
Coherent and consistent strategic moves are far easier to accept than inconsistent
decisions. Or, as expressed by Lamberg et al. (2009: 50), ‘‘inconsistent actions may
decrease the firm’s legitimacy among important stakeholders’’ and lead to undesired
actions by them (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Managers
should take this into consideration when communicating the strategic goal of the
envisaged transaction.
To summarize, our study complies with recent calls to further strengthen the
research stream on acquisition programs and, in doing so, adds to the organizational
learning literature in strategic management settings.
5.2 Limitations and outlook
The limitations of this study offer opportunities for improvement. They can be
subdivided into two dimensions: methods and interpretations.
First, the methodology used to measure strategic directions based on SIC is
subject to controversial discussions (Davis and Duhaime 1992; Hoskisson et al.
1993; Robins and Wiersema 2003). This paper adds a resource-based dimension by
determining vertical relationships between bidder and target using a method
proposed by Fan and Lang (2000) based on flows of goods and production. For the
sake of simplicity, we have not differentiated between forward and backward
vertical integration or pure and mixed vertical relationships (Fan and Goyal 2006).
The proposed procedure of determining strategic directions is a simplification;
however, it appears relatively sophisticated compared to current literature, in which
vertical relationships are mostly not taken into account.
Second, with regard to the interpretation of results, the aspect of generalization
needs attention. The sample selected from British, German, and French mid-cap to
large-cap firms covers around 60 percent of market capitalization in the European
Dow Jones 600 index. However, there is still 40 percent uncovered, which urges
caution when it comes to generalizing the results for Europe as a whole. Moreover,
it is noteworthy that the sample contains firms across all industries, except financial
services. Results need to be carefully assessed, since differences exist between
industries, especially relating to the measured degree of matches of SIC (Bettis and
Hall 1982).
Even with these limitations, however, we believe the study makes an important
contribution to the emerging stream of research on serial acquisitions, research on
transfer effects and organizational learning in strategic settings, as well as to
empirical research on strategic consistency. Our focus was to analyze whether
strategic consistency has an effect on the expected performance of serial
acquisitions. To further seize the coupling of the pattern and learning streams of
research of acquisition series, succeeding studies could start from here and analyze
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differences in patterns of acquisition direction and search for optimal patterns.
Further studies of strategic consistency in acquisition programs may include
divestment decisions, as they are generally an integral part of restructuring
programs. We look forward to studies that extend the strategic consistency concept
toward a congruency-related approach, also incorporating the fit of serial
acquisitions to external contingencies and competitive changes (Lamberg et al.
2009). Methodically, the innovative approach of cumulative capital market
perception offers room for further development and application beyond the context
of acquisition series.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
Appendix A Calculation of the expected cumulated rate of concordance
and fliprate
The calculation of the expected cumulated rate of concordance for each series rank r
is based on a multinomial distribution function:
f Xr ¼ k1; k2; . . .; ks; n; p1; p2; . . .; psð Þ ¼ n!




2  . . .  pkss
This function expresses the probability for a certain manifestation of the random
variable X. This random variable is characterized as tuple of manifestations of the
event classes k at a series rank r at n present acquisitions. k includes the four
different acquisition directions. They have the same probability of occurrence p. For
each tuple, the most occurring event class k at n present acquisitions the cumulated
concordance is calculated. In order to derive the expected value E, all occurring
manifestations of concordance are multiplied by the above-calculated probability X.
The calculation of the expected cumulated fliprate for each series rank r is based
on a binomial distribution function, as only two events (change of direction: yes or
no) are of relevance:
f ðXr ¼ k; nÞ ¼ nk
 
pkqnk
for the random variable X at series rank r; event class k and number of
acquisitions n.
See Appendix Table 5
See Appendix Fig. 2
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Table 5 Test assumptions linear regression – Endogenity
Error Term* Level I Error Term* Level II
Covariance p value Covariance p value
Independent variables Level I







Country dummy 0.000 1.000
Industry dummy 0.000 1.000
Year dummy 0.000 [0.800











Free float 0.000 1.000
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Fig. 2 Normally distributed residuals
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